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THE IMPACT OF LOHR V. MEDTRONIC ON THE FIRST
CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE
AMENDMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of the United States
attempted to resolve whether Congress intended that the federal Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA") preempt state law for remedying
medical device related injuries. 2 Prior to the Lohr decision, there was a
three-way split among the circuits regarding the proper application of
MDA preemption. In its ruling, the Court decisively held that the MDA
did not necessarily preempt a plaintiff's ability to bring suit against a
medical device manufacturer.4
Prior to Lohr, the First Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States
ruled differently with respect to the MDA preemption of state tort claims.5
In Talbott v. C.R. Bard,Inc.,6 the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the MDA preempted all state tort claims, and dismissed the plaintiffs'
case. 7 This decision came a year after C.R. Bard plead guilty in federal
district court to 391 criminal violations relating to the use of the same type
of catheter that was used in the Talbot case. 8 In United States v. C.R.Baed,
Inc.9 , the district court judge imposed criminal and civil fines
on C.R.

116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
2 Id. at 2250.
3 See infra notes 59 - 93.
4 116 S. Ct. 2239-40. The Lohr decision paved the way for plaintiffs to sue medical

manufacturers for all common-law causes of action despite running afoul with the federal
preemption statute. Id. at 2252.
5 See infra part IV(A).
6 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995).
7 Talbott, 63 F.3d at 31. A heart catheter, intended to prolong the victim's life,
malfunctioned by failing to deflate after being inserted in one of her coronary arteries,
resulting in the victim's death. Id. at 39, 41. The victim's heirs sued C.R. Bard, the
manufacturer of the catheter, for wrongful death, and also state tort claims of negligence,
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, breach of express and implied warranties,
negligence in hiring and training, battery, conspiracy, unfair trade practices, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 42. The plaintiffs sought punitive and compensatory
damages. Id.
8.
United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287 (D.Mass. 1994).
9.
848 F. Supp. 287 (D.Mass. 1994).
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Bard, totaling sixty-one million dollars.' ° The court recognized the harm
caused by C.R. Bard's criminal behavior and acknowledged that the criminal penalties it imposed could not adequately compensate these victims."
The court noted that civil suits would provide a more complete remedy for
these victims." In Talbott, however, the First Circuit held
that the MDA
preeempted any state tort claims against the defendant.. 3
This note will review the history of the MDA and analyze the differing interpretations of various circuits. It will also examine the the First
Circuit's recent interpretation and application of the MDA. Finally, this
comment will discuss the implications of the Lohr decision for attorneys in
the First Circuit.
I. HISTORY OF THE MDA

Congress enacted the MDA in 1938 in response to the rapid growth of
medical device technology. By enacting these amendments, Congress gave
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") the authority to regulate medical devices under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
("FDCA"). 4 Under these amendments, the FDA had limited power to
seize adulterated devices and to criminally prosecute the manufacturers
and distributors of such devices. 5 Specifically, the MDA allowed the
FDA to exercise this authority only after manufacturers sold their medical
devices through interstate commerce. 6 The advancement of medical technology forced the FDA to approve medical devices prior to distribution. 7
The introduction of intrauterine devices ("IUDs") and cardiac pacemakers

'o Id. at 292-93.

11Id.
12 Id.
13Talbott, 865 F. Supp. 37, 45-50 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 25, 31 (Ist Cir.
1995).
14 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)) (prohibiting commerce of adulterated or
misbranded medical devices).
15 See Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2

HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 1, 6 (1989).
1 Id. at 6-7.
'7

See Angela W. Kronenberg, King v. Collagen Corporation: FDA Approval

InsulatesMedical Device Manufacturersfrom State Common Law Liability, I I J. CONTEMP.
HEALTm L. & POL'Y 563 (1995).
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into the marketplace during the 1960s prompted more extensive regulation."
In 1969, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare formed a
committee ("Cooper Committee") to research and recommend procedures
for regulating medical devices.' 9 The Cooper Committee's research laid
the foundation for the 1976 Medical Device Amendments. 2° The committee set forth additional controls to ensure the safety and effectiveness of
new consumer products." Concurrently, the FDA sought to implement a
more comprehensive, but flexible, legislative scheme to regulate medical
devices.22
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to provide the FDA with a "comprehensive, yet flexible mechanism" to protect
public health by ensuring safe and effective regulation of medical devices. 21 Congress also intended to encourage the development of safe
24
medical devices by providing a highly regulated research process. While

38

See Bianca I. Truitt, Comment, Injured Consumers and the FDA: Should Federal

Preemption Protect Medical Device Manufacturers Under a Quasi-Governmental
Immunity?, 15 J. Legal Med. 155, 156 (1994).
'9Id. at 155-156. The "Cooper Committee" received its name from its chairman, Dr.
Theodore Cooper, the director of the National Heart and Lung Institute at that time. James
S. Benson et al., The FDA's Regulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of Change, 43 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 495 (1988). The Committee's report uncovered 10,000 device-related
injuries and 751 deaths in the preceding ten years. Leflar, supra note 14, at 6.
20 Benson, supranote 18, at 495.
23 Id. The late 1960s marked the start of a decade in which twenty-six consumer
protection laws were passed. See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A
Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 511, 512 (1988) (noting time commonly referred to as the "consumer decade").
22 Adler, supra note 20, at 511.
23 Id. The MDA was enacted largely as a result of the injuries suffered by women
using the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F.
Supp. 1426, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Thousands of women suffered from toxic shock,
infertility, and pelvic infections caused by an ill-conceived and poorly designed IUD. In re
A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 710-12 (4th Cir. 1989). Several witnesses testifying during
a Health Subcommittee Hearing in 1975, concluded that many of the deaths and illnesses
attributable to the Dalkon Shield could have been prevented if legislation controlling
medical devices was in place. Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 75354 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (citing S. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1975), reprintedin 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071).
24 Truitt, supra note 17, at 157. The three goals of the MDA are to: (1) assure public
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striving to protect consumers against unsafe products, the MDA also
sought to protect innovation and advancement of medical devices from
governmental restrictions.25
In creating the regulatory scheme of the MDA, Congress recognized
that medical devices differ both in composition and risk.26 As a result,
Congress created three different classes of devices and instructed the FDA
27
to intensely regulate those devices which pose a high risk to the public.
Of the classes created, "Class III" devices pose the greatest health risk.28
The MDA requires manufacturers of "Class III" medical devices to
obtain FDA approval through either of two methods before manufacturers
place the products into the market: pre-market approval application or premarket application notification. 29
Pre-market approval application
("PMA") requires manufacturers to conduct extensive testing to prove the
clinical safety and effectiveness of the device. 30 FDA staff members and

protection against unsafe and ineffective devices; (2) ensure that health practitioners can be
confident about the medical equipment they use or prescribe for their patients; and (3)
provide market protection for pioneers of new medical technologies. H.R. Rep. No. 808, 14
n.1 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6308 n.l.
25 H.R. Rep. No. 808, at 14 n.1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6308
n. 1.
26

27

Truitt, supra note 17, at 159.
David A. Kessler et al., The FederalRegulation of Medical Devices, 317 NEw ENG.

J. MED. 357, 364 (1987). "Class I" covers devices that are neither intended for significant
medical use nor likely to threaten human health. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(l)(A) (1994).
Examples of this class include elastic bandages and ice bags. Alder, supra note 20, at 512.
"Class II" devices require higher performance standards because the general controls under
"Class I" fail to provide reasonable assurance of their safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. §
360c (a)(I)(B) (1994). Examples of this class include syringes, hearing aids and bone
plates. Alder, supra note 20, at 513.
"Class III" devices present either a potentially unreasonable risk of illness or injury, or
include those devices intended for significant medical use. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(i)(C)
(1994). This class requires pre-market approval and cannot be placed into the market until
extensive testing in lab and clinical data proves their safety and effectiveness. Id. Examples
of "Class III" devices are pacemakers, IUDS, and artificial hearts. Alder, supra note 20, at
513.
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(l)(C) (1994). Recognizing that Class III devices pose the
greatest risk to the public, Congress tailored the regulatory scheme of the MDA to apply to
Class III devices. Alder, supra note 20, at 513.
29Benson, supra note 18, at 499.
30Id. at 500.
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outside experts must approve the PMA before the FDA will approve the
device for commercial use."
Pre-market notification allows a company to market a new medical
device without obtaining FDA approval if the manufacturer establishes that
the device is "substantially equivalent" to a device approved before 1976.32
Pre-market notification attempts to decrease the amount of time between
filing the application and the actual approval. 33 The FDA requires significantly less information for pre-market notification method than for premarket approval.34
Initially, most "Class Ill" medical devices reached the market through
pre-market notification, thus receiving less stringent scrutiny by the
FDA. 35 Congress recognized this trend and amended the pre-market notification requirements. 36 Now a manufacturer using pre-market notification
must disclose more information and provide clinical data demonstrating
that the device is safe and effective.37
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW UNDER THE MDA
The MDA expressly preempts competing state requirements.
§
tion 360k(a) of the MDA provides in pertinent part:

38

Sec-

31 Id. The safety and effectiveness of a device is determined with reference to the

persons for whose use the device is intended and to the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling of the device. Regulators must weigh any
probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or
illness from such use. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(2).
32 S. Rep. No. 94-33, at 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 110809. The FDA requires manufacturers wishing to sell or distribute a substantially equivalent
device to notify the FDA 90 days before doing so. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994). The
manufacturer must also indicate in which of the three classes the device falls and ensure the
FDA that the device complies with all applicable regulatory requirements. Id.
33 See Benson, supra note 19, at 499-500.
34 Truitt, supra note 17, at 159. The average time for approval under the premarket
notification method is 20 hours, whereas under the pre-market application method the
average time is 1200 hours. Id.
35 Paul H. Sunshine, The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191, 198-99 (1995).
36 See The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 4(a), 104 Stat.
4511,4515 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c (I) (1994)).
" See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (I)(l)(A)(ii) (1994).
38 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (a) (1994). The primary factor in determining whether
federal preemption exists is that a court must find Congressional intent to preempt. Rice v.
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[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this [Act] to the device, and (2) which related to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement
39
applicable to the device under this [Act].

The statute, however, allows a state to petition in certain circumstances for exemption from federal preemption.4 The exemption requirements provide state exemption from the MDA under two sets of circumstances. 4' First, a state cause of action may be exempt if state requirements are more stringent than those under the MDA.
Second, Congress
allows exemption where compelling local conditions exist, and compliance

with state requirements would not violate any of the requirements imposed
by the MDA.43
The statute also expressly empowers the FDA to implement the
MDA. 44 § 360(h) gives the FDA the power to require the manufacturer of
medical devices to repair, replace or refund the cost of a device presenting
an "unreasonable risk" of harm to public health.45 This section further

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). There are two ways a court may
determine Congressional intent to preempt: express intention or implied intention. Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Express intention occurs when the wording in
the regulation expressly provides an intent to preempt state law. Id. Implied intention
occurs when the court finds an implied intention to preempt based on any number of factors,
such as the comprehensive nature of the regulations or a direct conflict between state and
federal law. Hillsbourough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
'9 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (a) (1994).
40 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (b) (1994).
41 id.
42 id.
43 21 U.S.C. § 360k (b) (1994).

' 21 U.S.C. § 360h (d) (1994).
4' 21 U.S.C. § 360k (b) (1994). The FDA must determine: I) that a device intended
for human use that is brought into the market presents an unreasonable risk of substantial
harm to the public health; 2) that the FDA might reasonably believe that "the device was not
properly designed or manufactured with reference to the state of the art as it existed at the
time of its design and manufacture"; 3) that the FDA might reasonable believe that no
person other than the "manufacturer, importer, distributor, or retailer" failed to exercise due
care in the "installation, maintenance, repair, and or use of the device;" and 4) that
notification to the public would not be sufficient to remove the unreasonable risk of harm.
21 U.S.C. § 360h (b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (1996).
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states that compliance with an order issued pursuant to § 46360(h) shall not
relieve any person from liability under federal or state law.
Preemption applicability is also grounded in FDA regulations.47 Preemption applies when: 1) the state "establishes or continues in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement"; 2) the requirement is "different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable"
to a device under the MDA; and 3) the state requirement pertains "to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device" under the MDA48
IV. PREEMPTION IN TORT CASES

In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,4 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the issue of whether a federal statute can preempt state
tort law.5° The Cipollone court inquired whether the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims. 5 A majority of the Court held that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 ("1965 Act") did not preempt the plaintiffs' state law tort claims.52 A plurality, however, held that
the 1969 Act preempted only some of the plaintiffs' tort claims.53 The Su-

4

21 U.S.C. § 360h (d) (1994).

47 21 C.F.R. 808.1(b) (1994). § 808.1 (b) states in pertinent part:

[The MDA] prescribes a general rule that ... no State or political subdivision . . . may
device
establish or continue in effect any requirement with respect to a medical
intended for human use having the force and effect of law, which is different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under any provision of the act and
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under the act.
Id.
4' 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
49 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
50 Id.
"' See id. at 516-24 (addressing the issue of federal preemption of state tort claims).
The plaintiff brought the following five claims: failing to provide adequate warnings about
the health risks of smoking; expressly warranting products that were dangerous to
consumers' health; attempting to neutralize statutory warning effects; ignoring medical
advice on the dangers of smoking; and conspiring to prevent medical evidence from
reaching the general public. Id. at 524-30.
52 See id. at 530 (construing statute's preemption provision narrowly resulting in a
presumption against preemption).
13 See id. at 530-31 (noting 1969 Act created a preemptive effect with respect to state
common law claims).
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preme Court emphasized, through its decision, that lower courts must
closely examine the
54 plain language of a statute in order to ascertain Congressional intent.
Justice Blackmun concurred with the plurality, but dissented in part,
reasoninig that the 1969 Act obligated the Court to infer preemption only
where Congress "clear[ly] and manifest[ly]" intended to preempt state law
claims." Justice Blackmun argued that there were distinct differences
between the state tort law and the 1969 Act that significantly weakened the
plurality's holding. 56
After Cipollone, defendant manufacturers began to raise MDA's preemptive scope as a defense against state tort actions.57 Three different interpretations of the MDA emerged after the Cipollone decision. 58 The
First Circuit held that the MDA preempts all state tort claims, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the MDA preempts some state tort claims, and the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the MDA to not preempt any state tort claims.59
A. Total Preemption of State Tort Law Claims

The majority of federal circuits have held that the MDA preempts all
state tort claims. 6° These courts have held that the MDA preemption

54 Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-21 (1992).
55 See id. at 542 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting

every court of appeals considering the issue unable to find express preemption).
56 See Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 534-39 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding modified language of section 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2) no more
"clearly" exhibits intent to preempt than language of the 1965 Act).
57 See Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 916 (1994) (listing 22 rulings where courts held
MDA preemption of state tort claims under Cipollone rationale).
58 See e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding MDA
preempts all state tort claims); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1135, 1338-38 (11 th Cir.
1995) (ruling MDA preempts some state tort claims and not others); Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting FDA regulations as providing no state
common law preemption).
59 See infra notes 60-94.
60 See e.g., Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding
allegations of negligent manufacturing and distribution, failure to warn, and breach of
implied warranty claims with respect to a defective pacemaker preempted); King v.
Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding state tort claims relating to
Zyderm device preempted); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993)
(ruling state tort claims regarding Zyderm anti-wrinkle device preempted).
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clause sweeps broadly to include state common law tort actions if
"different from or in addition to" the federal law. 6 1 The courts reasoned
that ruling for a plaintiff would judicially create state imposed requirements on the manufacturer which differ from the FDA's regulations.62
Talbott illustrates the First Circuit's reasoning.6 3 In April 1994, C.R.
Bard, Inc. plead guilty to 391 felonies arising out of its willful and knowing violations of FDA regulations and federal laws. 64 After learning of
C.R. Bard's criminal proceedings, the heirs of Eunice Beaver, filed a civil
suit alleging wrongful death, negligence and breach of warranty against
65
C.R. Bard. Ms. Beaver died after a heart catheter, manufactured by C.R.
Bard and used in a procedure intended to enhance her health and extend
her life, malfunctioned. 66 The First Circuit upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, relying on previous First Circuit
decisions. It also affirmed the district court's holding that § 360k(a) of the
MDA preempted all of the plaintiffs' claims. 61
The Talbott court determined state tort law fell within section 360k(a)
because it imposed "requirements" to only include state statutes and regulations, and not common law cause of actions. 6' The district court analyzed each of the plaintiffs' claims individually, allowing the First Circuit
to adopt the district court's
• 69 finding and conclude that each claim imposed
Applying similar reasoning to previous First
an additional regulation.
Circuit cases regarding MDA preemption, the 7°Talbott court decided the
MDA preempted the plaintiffs' state tort claims.

61
62
63

Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421.
King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36.
See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding § 360k(a)

of the MDA preempts all the plaintiffs' state tort claims).
64 See United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 292-93 (D. Mass 1994)
(finding C.R. Bard, Inc. culpable and imposing a fine of sixty-one million dollars for
violations).
65 Talbott, 63 F.3d at 31.
66 Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 37.
67 See Talbott, 63 F.3d at 31 (relying on King as authority for its decision).
68 Id. at 27. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs reading of "requirements" to only
include state statutes and regulations, not common law causes of actions, had already been
dismissed by the First Circuit in King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 113-36 (1st Cir.
1993) and in Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 16 (ist Cir. 1994).
69 See Talbott, 65 F.3d at 31 (noting district judge's opinion reaching the correct
result should not be re-analyzed by reviewing court).
70 See id. at 27 (using King and Mendes as authority for its ruling).
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B. Preemption of Only Some State Tort Law Claims
The Eleventh Circuit has refrained from interpreting § 360k(a) as a
total preemption of common law state tort claims." In Lohr v. Medtronic,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit found the MDA to preempt only two of the
plaintiffs' state tort claims.73 Unlike Talbott, the litigant in Lohr presented
court with a device that reached the market under the pre-notification process. 74 The FDA found the Medtronic pacemaker "substantially equivalent"
to an earlier marketed device, allowing Medtronic 75to market the pacemaker
without satisfying the PMA process requirements.
The Lohr court resolved the issue of whether Congress intended to
protect the public and encourage development of medical devices by preempting state laws. 76 The court examined the phrase "state requirement"
and concluded that the MDA preemption provision encompassed some
state tort claims. 77 The court also held that the MDA's clause providing
state exemption did not allow a finding that the MDA preempted all state
law liability. 78 The court held that the MDA preempted the plaintiffs'

71 See Lohr v. Medtronic, 56 F.3d 1335, 1338-39 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (holding MDA

preemption of only two, and not all the plaintiff's claims). See also Ministry of Health v.
Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (establishing partial preemption
under the MDA); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1278-86 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding express warranty claim not preempted while rest of claims are preempted).
72 56 F.3d 1135 (11 th Cir. 1995).
73 See id. at 1340-52 (alleging claims of negligent design, manufacturing, failure to
warn and strict liability in tort). The plaintiff received a pacemaker manufactured by
Medtronic, Inc. which failed several years after it was implanted. Id. at 1339. The plaintiff
was forced to undergo emergency surgery because of a defective component in the
pacemaker. Id.
74 See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1340 (noting device underwent less stringent regulation
despite being a Class III device).
75 Id. The FDA found the lead component to be a substantially-equivalent device
because the device had the same intended use as a previously approved device, possessed
similar technological characteristics of the device and was as safe and effective as the earlier
device. Id.
76 See Lohr v. Medtronic, 56 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.I (1 th Cir. 1995) ((citing Mertens v.
Hewitt Ass'n., 508 U.S. 248 (1993)). The court held that "courts must be mindful of the fact
that legislative acts reflect many competing interests and should not allow vague notions
about a statutes overall purpose to overcome its text." id.
77 Id. at 1341-42.
78 See id. at 1342-43 (noting MDA's exemption clause did not explicitly
state tort
liability must be maintained).
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claims of negligent manufacturing and failure to warn consumers, but did
not preempt the plaintiffs' claims of negligent design and strict liability. 79
C. No Preemptionof State Tort Claims
The Ninth Circuit refused to find total preemption and held that the
MDA preempts none of the plaintiffs' state tort claims.80 The court interpreted "requirement" to include state common law claims.8' The court,
favored the plaintiffs' claims and relied heavily on the legislative history's
emphasis on ensuring consumer safety. 2 Additionally, the court relied on
the FDA's interpretation of the MDA to support the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort claims.8 3
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 4 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
FDA regulations to preempt none of the plaintiffs' state claims." The
plaintiff alleged she developed an auto-immune disease after receiving a
Zyderm Collagen Implant, and brought six separate tort claims. 86 The dis-

79

Id. at 1350-52.

go See, eg., Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding
no preemption of state product liability claim for defective hip replacement device);
Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (ruling MDA did not
preempt strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty, claims regarding knee
device); Fogel v. Steinfeld, 620 N.Y.S.2d 875, 883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (ruling defective
design, breach of warranty and failure-to-warn cliams against pacemaker manufacturer were
not preempted).
s, Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md. 1989).
82 See id. at 667 (stating MDA legislative history
lacks Congressional intent to
preempt state tort law). The courts recognize a strong presumption against preemption
absent a clear statement of Congressional intent in matters relating to public health and
safety. See Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989). Also
the courts point to the legislative history's emphasis on ensuring consumer safety, therefore
the plaintiffs must be ensured an opportunity for judicial recourse. Haudrich v. Howmedica,
Inc., 267 Ill. App. 3d 630, 644, 642 N.E.2d 206, 217 (Il1.App. Ct. 1994).
83 See Oja, 848 F. Supp. at 906 n.1 (noting FDA regulations impose limits on
preemption). See also Elbert v. Howmedica, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 327, 331-32 (D. Haw.
1993) (finding underlying regulations not preempting state tort claims).
84 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
85 Id. at 1459-60.
86 See id. 67 F.3d at 1454 (noting plaintiff claims included negligence, strict liability,
breach of warranty, battery, conspiracy, and loss of consortium).
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trict court granted Collagen's motion for summary judgment, finding the
MDA preempted each of the plaintiffs' claims. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for• the
Ninth Circuit reversed the
88
district court's holding of total preemption.
The court examined the
FDA's interpretation of the MDA preemption clause to determine which
state claims the clause preempted. s9 The court emphasized the traditional
presumption against preemption and found that Congress failed to specify
a "state requirement" under the MDA.9°
The Kennedy court found that PMA approval did not constitute a
"specific requirement." 9' The court reasoned that if state claims were always preempted in cases where the device had been approved through the
PMA process, plaintiffs would never obtain an adequate remedy. 92 The
court further stated that if the court prevents plaintiffs from judicial recourse, it would subvert Congress' original intent of protecting consumers. 93 Consequently, the Kennedy court held that the MDA preempted
none of the plaintiffs state tort claims.94
V. LOHR V. MEDTRONIC

95

With a distinct split among the circuits regarding the MDA preemption provision, the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged the
need to define the preemptive scope of the MDA. 96 After Ms. Lohr's

88

Id. at 1455.
Id. at 1460.

89

See Kennedy v. Collagen, 67 F.3d 1453, at 1457-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (reiterating that

87

FDA interpretations control because Congress charged the FDA with implementation of the

MDA).
90 Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1457.
91See id. at 1459 (noting although PMA involves specific requirements does not
mean it acts as a specific requirement).
92 See id. (noting interpretation leaves Class III device consumers without judicial
recourse).
9'See id. at 1457-60 (noting PMA must benefit consumers, not "create a rose garden,

free from liability, for manufacturers").
94 Kennedy v. Collagen, 67 F.3d 1453, at 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1995).
9'116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
96 See id. On January 19, 1996, the Court granted the petition for certiorari filed in
Lohr v. Metronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996)
(Nos. 95-754, 95-886). The First Circuit applied total preemption, the Eleventh Circuit
applied partial preemption, and the Ninth Circuit applied no preemption. See also supra
notes 49-94.

1998]

MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS

Medtronic pacemaker failed resulting in a "complete heart block" and
emergency surgery, the Lohrs filed suit against Medtronic in Florida state
97
court.
They attempted to demonstrate Medtronic's liability on the theories of strict liability and negligent manufacturing." The negligence count
alleged a breach of Medtronic's duty to use reasonable care in the design,
manufacture, assembly and sale of the subject pacemaker. 99 The breach of
duty included using defective materials in the lead of the catheter and the
company's failure to warn physicians about the tendency of the pacemaker
to fail., ° The plaintiffs further alleged that the device's inherent defective
condition made Medtronic strictly liable.'0 '
Medtronic removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) preempted
both the negligence and strict liability clause. 2 The district court found
no authority to support Medtronic's argument.1 3 The court found that the
MDA did not entirely exempt a manufacturer from liability where it allegedly violated the FDA's regulationsT 4 Shortly after the district court decided Lohr, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that § 360k required preemption of some state common law
claims brought against a manufacturer of a medical device.'
The district
court reconsidered its previous ruling in light of the Eleventh Circuit's in-

See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 1995). The
crosspetitoner, Lora Lohr, is dependent on pacemaker technology for the proper functioning
of her heart. Id. In 1987, she received a Medtronic pacemaker implant equipped with one
of the Company's Model 4011 pacemaker leads. Id. On December 30, 1990, the
pacemaker failed resulting in a "complete heart block" that required emergency surgery. Id.
The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits the heartbeat, steadying the electrical
signal from the "pulse generator" to the heart itself. Id. According to Lohr's physician, the
malfunction of the pacemaker was caused by a defect in the lead of the pacemaker. Id.
98 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2247.
99 See id. at 1347-49 (noting complaint of defective lead materials and failure to warn
about pacemaker's tendency to fail).
100 Id.
"a0Id. at 2248. A third count alleging breach of warranty was dismissed for failure to
97

state a claim under Florida law. Id.
102 Id.
103 Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1996).
104 See id. at 2248 (citing from application for petition for certiorari review).
105 See generally Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11 th Cir. 1994) (finding §
360k(a) to be somewhat preemptive of state common law actions involving medical
devices).
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terpretation of §360k, reversed its earlier decision, and dismissed the
Lohr's complaint. °6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and affirmed parts of the
district court's holding. 0 7 The Court of Appeals decided that "common
law actions are state requirements within the meaning of § 360k(a)" and
preemption could not be avoided by alleging that the negligence flowed
from a violation of federal standards.'
The court found the term
"requirement " unclear and turned to the FDA's regulations regarding preemption for guidance. 1 9 Under these regulations, the court concluded that
the federal requirements "should, in some way, be 'restricted by nature' to
a particular process, procedure, or device and should not be completely
open-ended."

110

From this analysis, the court concluded that the MDA did not preempt
the Lohr's negligent design claims."' However, it concluded that the
FDA's general "good manufacturing practices" regulations and the FDA
labeling requirements did result in preemption of the negligent manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims.'2 The court held there was no preemption of the strict liability claims insofar as the plaintiffs alleged an unreasonable dangerous design. 13 The court precluded the plaintiffs from reviving the negligent manufacturing or failure-to-warn claims under a strict
liability theory.14
Medtronic filed a petition seeking review of the Court of Appeal's
decision in that it affirmed the district court's ruling that allowed the Lohrs
106 See Lohr, 116 S. Ct at 2248 (finding preemption based on 1 th Circuit's Duncan
analysis).
107 See Meditronic, Inc. v. Lohr & Lohr v. Meditronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1342-44

( lIth Cir. 1995).
10' Id. at 1342.
109 See id. at 1344 (noting regulations provided no preempted state requirements unless
FDA has established specific requirements applicable to particular device).
"0 See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1346 (noting federal regulation did not specifically address
pacemakers, yet not be so broad either).
...
See id. at 1347-49 (rejecting Medtronics contention that FDA's finding of
"substantial equivalence" had any significance with respect to pacemaker's safety).
112 See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1350 (11 th Cir. 1995);
21 C.F.R. §§
820.20-820.198 (explaining FDA regulations establish general requirements for most steps
in every device's manufacture); see also 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1995) (noting FDA labeling
requirements require devices to bear warnings).
"' Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1351-52.
14id.
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to go forward with their claims of strict liability and negligent manufacturing. "' Subsequently, the Lohrs filed a cross-petition seeking review of
the judgment in that it upheld the preemption defense.' 16 The Supreme
Court granted both petitions acknowledging the need for it to define
MDA's preemptive scope. 1 7 The Court concluded that none of the Lohrs'
state law claims are preempted."i
The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit holding that the Lohrs' design
claims could go forward." 9 Additionally, the Lohrs were allowed to proceed with the manufacture and failure-to-warn claims.2 ° The plurality
found Medtronic's claim of preemption to be "not only unpersuasive, [but]
implausible."'' The plurality further stated that given the ambiguities in
the statute and the scope of preclusion that would occur otherwise, the
Court could not accept Medtronic's theory that by using the term
"requirement," Congress clearly intended to deprive states of a role in
protecting consumers. 122
Justice Breyer, concurring in part, agreed with the plurality, but was
not convinced that future incidents of MDA preemption of common law
claims will be "few and rare.' ' 123 The Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the plurality's view that the MDA preempts

115 Lohr v. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1996).
116 id.

See id. (recognizing division between circuits over which state common law claims
are preempted by MDA).
"' See id., 116 S. Ct. at 2258 (noting critical importance of device specificity and
Court's construction of § 360k resulted in very little preemption).
17

119 Id.
120 Lohr

v. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2258 (1996).
(1996) (stating Medtronic's interpretation requires greater

121See id. at 2251

interference with state legal remedies).
122 See id. at 2252 (expressing Court's concern of intruding into state sovereignty).
The Court explains that Congress was mainly concerned with the problem of conflicting
state statutes and regulations, rather than general duties enforced by common law actions.
Id. at 2253. The Court also cites to legislative history to support the position that §360k (a)
was not intended to preempt most general common law actions. Id.
123 See id. (stating MDA will sometimes preempt a state law tort suit). Justice Breyer
concludes a federal requirement preempts a state requirement if: (1) the state requirement
conflicts with the federal requirement, with because compliance is impossible or the state
requirement stands as an obstacle to the execution of Congress' objectives, or (2) the
scheme of the federal requirement is so persuasive as to make a reasonable inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. Id.
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"few, if any common law."'' 1 4 These Justices interpreted section 360k(a)
not to preclude states from imposing different or additional remedies, but
only different or additional requirements.
Despite different reasoning, a
unanimous Supreme Court rejected the complete preemption argument
proffered by Meditronic. 26
VI. LOHR'S IMPACT ON THE FIRST CIRCUIT

In Comeau v. Heller,127 the First Circuit addressed the MDA issue and
its preemptive scope for the first time since Lohr. 2s Ms. Comeau allegedly received a defective SciMed angioplasty catheter and
. -brought
. 4, . 129a products liability action in Massachusetts state court against SciMed.
SciMed attempted to remove the case to federal court by arguing that the
catheter involved was
a "Class III" medical device subject to the MDA
3
regulatory scheme. 0
SciMed attempted to assert federal jurisdiction by arguing that the
"complete preemption" doctrine, created by the First Circuit's application
of the MDA, was an "independent corollary" of the well plead complaint
rule.' 3' Considering the recent Lohr decision, the Comeau court found the
124

Id. at 2259.

125See id. at 2259-60 (stating manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims, if successful,

would impose different or additional requirements to federal requirements).
126 See Lohr v. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2257 (1996) (finding MDA preemption
only when particular state requirements threaten to interfere with specific federal interests).
127 945 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1996).
328 See id. at 9 (holding MDA did not completely preempt state common law claims).
Plaintiff alleged that her injuries were caused by a defective catheter. Id. The first
angioplasty disclosed a filling defect initially suspected to be a clot. Id. Following the
second angioplasty, Ms. Comeau went into cardiac arrest and underwent bypass surgery. Id.
The surgeon found that the obstruction in the filling defect was not a clot, but rather a
plastic protective sheath from the angioplasty catheter used in previous surgery. Id.
129 See id. at 7 (noting plaintiff also brought negligent actions against physician and
state).
130 See id. at 9 (discussing SciMed's contention that MDA authorizes jurisdiction
in
federal court).
131 See id. (stating Supreme Court held an "independent corollary" of the well-pleaded
complaint rule exists). The "independent corollary" exists if: "a federal cause of action
completely preempts a state cause of action, [in which case] any complaint that comes
within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law." See
id., 945 F. Supp. at 9 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. i, 22-24 (1983)). Therefore, under the "complete preemption"
doctrine, a defendant may remove a case to federal court, even if no federal claims are
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"complete preemption" doctrine not to be applicable in the context of the
jurisdiction
MDA. 32 The court concluded that it lacked subject matter
133
over the claims, and remanded the case back to state court.
SciMed distinguished Lohr by asserting that Lohr did not address
cases involving "Class 11" medical devices subjected to the PMA rocess,
and therefore, Lohr was not applicable to Ms. Comeau's claim. 8 4 The
court noted that the Supreme Court was aware of the distinction between a
PMA and a premarket notification device, and still did not limit its holding
decito only one process.135 The Comeau court refused to read the Lohr
36
explicitly.
hold
to
failed
Court
Supreme
the
what
decide
sion and
The court hesitantly concluded that the MDA does not completely
preempt state tort claims.' 37 It did state that some of the plaintiffs' claims
However, the court recognized
maybe subject to the MDA preemption.
the issue at bar pertained to subject matter jurisdiction and not preemption. 39 In Comeau, the First Circuit leaves the impression that it agrees
with the dissent in Lohr, insofar as that some common law actions are
subject to MDA preempon.'
VII. CONCLUSION

The language used in Comeau opinion exemplifies the First Circuit's
reluctance to find a presumption against preemption. Since the Lohr decision, the First Circuit has applied Lohr's holding found mostly in product
liability cases involving devices other than medical devices. The First Circuit has found preemption in these cases, reasoning that Lohr pertained to
medical devices only. Comeau is the only case in the First Circuit which
involves a medical device, and the court not to apply Lohr, but rather removed it back to state court. With the history of the First Circuit's applipresented on the face of the complaint. Id.
132

See Comeau, 945 F. Supp. at 9 (concluding Lohr curtailed MDA's total

preemption).
"' Id. at 12.
14 See id. at 11-12 (noting the device in

Lohr was subjected to premarket

notification).
135 See Comeau v. Heller, 945 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Mass. 1996) (recognizing Supreme
Court did not limit its holding to either process).
136 id.
137 Id.
138

id.

139 See id. (stating after Lohr, the short answer to complete preemption is no).
140 Comeau v. Heller, 945 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Mass. 1996).
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cation of the MDA preemption provision, and its recent decisions after
Lohr, the First Circuit still seeks to apply preemption. Although the First
Circuit has not directly addressed preemption of the MDA, the First Circuit
has shown its reluctance to follow Lohr in full.
Jennifer Salvatore O'Connor

